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Cognitive models posit that the fear of negative evaluation (FNE) is a hallmark feature of
social anxiety. As such, individuals with high FNE may show biased information processing
when faced with social evaluation.The aim of the current study was to examine the neural
underpinnings of anticipating and processing social-evaluative feedback, and its correlates
with FNE. We used a social judgment paradigm in which female participants (N = 31) were
asked to indicate whether they believed to be socially accepted or rejected by their peers.
Anticipatory attention was indexed by the stimulus preceding negativity (SPN), while the
feedback-related negativity and P3 were used to index the processing of social-evaluative
feedback. Results provided evidence of an optimism bias in social peer evaluation, as
participants more often predicted to be socially accepted than rejected. Participants with
high levels of FNE needed more time to provide their judgments about the social-evaluative
outcome. While anticipating social-evaluative feedback, SPN amplitudes were larger for
anticipated social acceptance than for social rejection feedback. Interestingly, the SPN
during anticipated social acceptance was larger in participants with high levels of FNE.
None of the feedback-related brain potentials correlated with the FNE.Together, the results
provided evidence of biased information processing in individuals with high levels of FNE
when anticipating (rather than processing) social-evaluative feedback.The delayed response
times in high FNE individuals were interpreted to reflect augmented vigilance imposed by
the upcoming social-evaluative threat. Possibly, the SPN constitutes a neural marker of this
vigilance in females with higher FNE levels, particularly when anticipating social acceptance
feedback.
Keywords: fear of negative evaluation, social evaluation, feedback anticipation, stimulus preceding negativity,
feedback-related negativity, P3, EEG, event-related brain potentials
INTRODUCTION
The fear of negative evaluation (FNE) is considered to be a
hallmark of social anxiety. Cognitive theories posit that this
fear may result from biased information processing, particularly
when anticipating a fearful event (Clark and McManus, 2002).
Socially anxious individuals exhibit maladaptive appraisal of social
situations, which is characterized by the selective retrieval of
negative information about themselves (Rapee and Heimberg,
1997). This biased information is then utilized to make neg-
ative self-evaluations (Rapee and Heimberg, 1997; Clark and
McManus, 2002). Rapee and Spence (2004) proposed in their
influential model that social anxiety can be viewed as lying on
a continuum: the lower end of this continuum reflects a total
lack of social anxiety, the middle of the continuum marks a
strong desire to be positively evaluated, and the highest end
of this continuum is marked by an intense fear and avoidance
of social situations/interactions. Those individuals who can be
placed at the highest end of this continuum meet the criteria
of social anxiety disorder or social phobia (Rapee and Spence,
2004; Morrison and Heimberg, 2013). In most cognitive mod-
els it is postulated that individuals with social anxiety display
a variety of information processing biases (e.g., negative self-
referential biases, increased self-focused attention) that generate
feelings of anxiety. This anxiety and the negative appraisal of
the self contribute to the maintenance of social anxiety by a
series of vicious cycles (Clark and McManus, 2002; Morrison
and Heimberg, 2013). Neurocognitive theories posit that these
information processing biases may be due to aberrant emotion
regulation strategies, caused by impaired top-down regulation of
negative affect by prefrontal brain structures (Etkin and Wager,
2007; Etkin, 2010; Brühl et al., 2011; Brühl et al., 2013). To date,
however, the neural underpinnings of information processing
biases related to FNE remain poorly understood. In the cur-
rent study we focus on the middle end of the social anxiety
continuum and will examine the neural underpinnings of social-
evaluative feedback anticipation, and the processing thereof. We
aim to investigate how individual differences in FNE modu-
late this neural activity in order to delineate the electrocortical
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signatures of the information processing biases implicated in social
anxiety.
An appealing paradigm to study social evaluation is the social
judgment paradigm introduced by Somerville et al. (2006). In
this paradigm, participants are shown portrait photographs of
unfamiliar peers, and are led to believe that these peers have previ-
ously formed impressions about the participant. The participant
is asked to judge whether peers either formed positive (i.e., like)
or negative (i.e., dislike) impressions. After each judgment, par-
ticipants are provided with peer feedback that is either congruent
or incongruent with their prior expectations. In this study it was
shown that valence of the judgment was related to activation of
the ventral anterior cingulate cortex (vACC), whereas the dorso-
lateral anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) was particularly sensitive
to violations of participant’s expectations. In a follow up study
it was demonstrated that the magnitude of the vACC activation
to positive social-evaluative feedback was enhanced in individu-
als with low self-esteem, as compared to individuals with high
self-esteem (Somerville et al., 2010). Using the same paradigm,
Gunther Moor et al. (2010b) found that the magnitude of this
polarization in brain activation followed a linear increase during
development. This finding was accompanied by an optimistic self-
evaluation bias in 19–25 years old participants. Namely, older
participants made significantly more positive social evaluation
judgments in comparison to younger participants. This optimistic
self-evaluation bias was interpreted in terms of social belong-
ingness theory (Baumeister and Leary, 1995), which states that
social acceptance has a high evolutionary value, as it promotes
survival and well-being in humans. Accordingly, it has been pro-
posed that social-evaluative threat may serve as a signal that the
need for social connection is not being satisfied. In turn, this
“need to belong” may augment the desire to form bonds with
other people (Maner et al., 2007). Together, the above findings
suggest that people have positive expectations about social eval-
uation by peers, and that this optimism bias is governed by a
ventral medial prefrontal neural network, brain regions frequently
implicated in self-referential processing and mentalizing (Amodio
and Frith, 2006). Interestingly, the magnitude of the polarization
in brain activation after receiving positive vs. negative feedback
seems subject to individual differences (e.g., levels of self-esteem),
suggesting that the social judgment paradigm may be a suitable
paradigm to examine biomarkers of social-evaluative fear, a related
construct to social anxiety (Watson and Friend, 1969; Rapee and
Heimberg, 1997; Weeks et al., 2005; Weeks and Howell, 2012;
Levinson et al., 2013).
Due to its fine-grained temporal resolution, investigating
event-related brain potentials (ERPs) could add an important
dimension to our understanding of individual differences in
anticipatory vs. feedback-related processing of social-evaluative
information. In a recent study, Van der Veen et al. (2013) inves-
tigated feedback ERPs using the social judgment paradigm.
Results of this study corroborated the enhanced brain activity
after receiving social acceptance feedback. That is, participants
displayed a significantly larger P3 component when they were
presented with expected social acceptance feedback. However,
anticipatory processes were not examined in this study, and
the small sample size prohibited the authors from examining
individual differences in the processing of social-evaluative
feedback.
The purpose of this study was to examine individual dif-
ferences in neural activity associated with the anticipation of
social-evaluative feedback, as well as the processing of this infor-
mation. We measured FNE in a sample of healthy female adult
participants, as it was anticipated that FNE would bias both antic-
ipatory and feedback-related neural activity, as well as behavioral
judgments about the social-evaluative outcome. Although FNE
only reflects a part of the social anxiety spectrum, namely the
interaction anxiety subtype (Mattick and Clarke, 1998), it has
been used in a host of studies as an index of non-clinical social
anxiety (Wieser et al., 2009; Abraham et al., 2013; Rossignol et al.,
2013; Salemink et al., 2013). We measured the stimulus preced-
ing negativity (SPN) as a neural index of anticipatory attention.
The SPN is a slow negative potential that progressively increases
in amplitude prior to the onset of a feedback stimulus (Böcker
and Boxtel, 1997; Brunia et al., 2011). The morphology of the
SPN is dependent on the specific task parameters, but SPN ampli-
tudes generally increase for feedback stimuli that convey affective
or motivational valence (Böcker et al., 2001). Peak SPN ampli-
tudes display a right lateralized dominance in time-estimation
and gambling experiments (Brunia et al., 2011), but the antic-
ipation of appetitive feedback stimuli (e.g., rewarding stimuli)
has been associated with left-lateralized dominance of the SPN
(Poli et al., 2007). Further, SPN amplitudes seem to be dependent
on the level of certainty about the upcoming feedback stimulus,
namely, SPN amplitudes have been found to be larger prior to
unpredictable – thus uncertain – feedback stimuli (Catena et al.,
2012). Since intolerance of uncertainty is posited to be a significant
contributor to social-evaluative fears (Whiting et al., 2013), it was
anticipated that the SPN would constitute a neural marker of this
uncertainty of social evaluation. Moreover, measuring the SPN
during the anticipation of both social rejection and acceptance
feedback allowed us to examine whether females with high FNE
would divert more attention to upcoming rejection or acceptance
feedback.
The processing of social-evaluative feedback can be indexed
with the feedback-related negativity and P3 components of the
feedback-related brain potential. The FRN is a frontocentral
negative component peaking approximately 250 ms after feed-
back onset, whereas the P3 shows peak amplitudes at around
300–600 ms post stimulus. The FRN is typically elicited by feed-
back stimuli that are incongruent with prior expectations, and
is frequently interpreted to reflect performance monitoring (Van
Noordt and Segalowitz, 2012). In contrast, the P3 is considered
to be a more cognitive component, governed by top-down atten-
tional control mechanisms (Polich, 2007). A recent study revealed
that P3 amplitudes in the social judgment paradigm were larger
for positive than for negative feedback (Van der Veen et al., 2013),
a finding that was interpreted to reflect a confirmation of social
acceptance and its inherent feeling of reward.
In the current study we examined the following hypotheses:
(1) conform findings of Gunther Moor et al. (2010b) and in line
with Social Belongingness Theory (Baumeister and Leary, 1995),
we hypothesized an optimism bias in our participant sample –
such that participants would anticipate social acceptance more
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often than social rejection; (2) Based on the notion that socially
anxious individuals anticipate social rejection more often (Clark
and McManus, 2002), it was anticipated that this optimistic self-
evaluation bias would only be present in females with low FNE
levels; (3) In line with the notion of the uncertainty hypothesis of
the SPN (Catena et al., 2012), we expected that SPN amplitudes
would be larger for social acceptance than for rejection judg-
ments in females with higher FNE levels, since females high in
FNE may expect rejection more often, rendering social acceptance
more unlikely; (4) Based on fMRI results showing increased brain
activation after receiving positive-evaluative feedback (Somerville
et al., 2006; Gunther Moor et al., 2010b; Somerville et al., 2010),
we anticipated larger P3 amplitudes when feedback commu-
nicated social acceptance. It was hypothesized that this effect
would be more pronounced in females with higher FNE levels,
since P3 amplitude is modulated both by valence and expectancy
(Ferdinand et al., 2012). As we anticipated that females high in
FNE would predict social acceptance less often, feedback signaling




Thirty-one female participants aged between 18 and 24 years
(mean age = 19.78; SD = 1.45) participated in this study. All
participants were right handed as verified with the Edinburgh
Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971) and had no history of
neurological or psychiatric disorders. Participants had normal
or corrected-to-normal vision, and were free from psychoac-
tive medication. Participants were recruited from or within the
proximity of the university, provided signed informed consent,
and were awarded course credit or fixed payment for their
participation. None of the participants had any doubts about
the cover story (see Experimental design and procedure). The
protocol for this study was reviewed and approved by the med-
ical ethical review committee of the Leiden University Medical
Center.
FEAR OF NEGATIVE EVALUATION
Fear of negative evaluation was assessed with the Dutch trans-
lated brief version of the Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale, revised
(BFNE-R; Bögels and Reith, 1999; Carleton et al., 2006). The
BFNE-R has demonstrated excellent levels of internal consistency
and test–retest reliability, correlates highly with the full scale FNE,
and is a commonly used measure of social anxiety (Collins et al.,
2005; Carleton et al., 2011). The BFNE-R consists of 12 statements
about social-evaluative situations. Participants have to indicate on
a 5-point Likert scale the degree to which each statement applies
to them (0 = not at all characteristic of me; 4 = extremely charac-
teristic of me). Carleton et al. (2011) showed that a cut-off score of
38 can be employed to specify individuals showing clinical signs
of social anxiety disorder. An excellent internal consistency was
obtained for the items within the current sample (α = 0.95). To
test the validity of the FNE scores, we measured levels of social
anxiety, self-esteem, behavioral inhibition, and rejection sensi-
tivity, with the Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (LSAS; Liebowitz,
1987), the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSES; Rosenberg, 1965),
Behavioral Inhibition Scale (BIS; Carver and White, 1994), and
Rejection Sensitivity Questionnaire (RSQ; Downey and Feldman,
1996), respectively. Mean scores on the self-report measures are
presented in Table 1. The FNE correlated significantly with all
measures and yielded good-to-excellent internal consistencies (see
Table 2).
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURE
A modified version of the social judgment paradigm was used
(Somerville et al., 2006; Gunther Moor et al., 2010b). With a cover
story, participants were led to believe that they would partici-
pate in a study on first impressions. Approximately 2 weeks prior
to the experimental session, participants were asked to send a
personal portrait photograph to the investigators. A panel of
peer undergraduate students from other universities would eval-
uate this photograph, and provide a judgment based on their
first impressions (i.e., like or dislike the person on the photo-
graph). At the day of the experiment, participants completed
the social judgment paradigm together with another cognitive
task (order of presentation was counterbalanced between par-
ticipants) of which the data will not be presented in this study.
Prior to the social judgment experiment, participants were told
that they would see portrait photographs of each member of
this panel of peers. Their task was to judge whether this peer
member liked or disliked the participant. A total of 160 pho-
tographs of peers were used (50% male), derived from taking
photographs of undergraduates from different universities. Pho-
tos of the peers were presented at a 17-inch monitor [60 Hz
refresh rate; visual angle (width/height) = (4.66◦× 6.05◦)] using
Table 1 | Means, standard deviations (SD) and range (minimum–
maximum) of the scores on the self-reported questionnaires.
Questionnaire Mean (SD) Range (min.–max.)
Fear of Negative Evaluation (FNE) 23.00 (11.35) 4–47
Social Anxiety (LSAS) 35.48 (15.33) 12–87
Self-Esteem (RSES) 9.77 (4.91) 1–18
Rejection Sensitivity (RSS) 7.82 (3.81) 2.78–14.61
Behavioral Inhibition (BIS) 22.26 (3.45) 16–27
Table 2 | Internal consistencies of the questionnaires used to index





Social Anxiety (LSAS) 0.91 r (31) = 0.36, p = 0.045
Self-Esteem (RSES) 0.87 r (31) = 0.63, p < 0.0001
Rejection Sensitivity (RSS) 0.88 r (31) = 0.59, p = 0.001
Behavioral inhibition (BIS) 0.86 r (31) = 0.56, p = 0.001
Scores on these measures correlated positively with scores on the fear of
negative evaluation (FNE) questionnaire.
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E-prime 2.0 stimulus presentation software (Psychology Software
Tools, Pittsburgh, PA, USA). All peer photographs had a neutral
facial expression, as ascertained with the Self-Assessment Manikin
(SAM) on a 9-point scale (Bradley and Lang, 1994). These SAM-
ratings of arousal and valence were obtained from an independent
sample of volunteers (N = 21), gender and age-matched to the
participants.
An illustration of a single trial is shown in Figure 1. Each trial
commenced with the depiction of the cue for 3000 ms display-
ing the neutral face of the peer. The cue remained on the screen
until the end of the trial. During this 3000 ms interval, partici-
pants were required to provide their positive (i.e., “acceptance”)
or negative (i.e., “rejection”) judgments by pressing one of two
buttons on an armrest. The order of which button (left or right)
corresponded with acceptance (“YES”) or rejection (“NO”) antici-
pations was counterbalanced between participants. If participants
did not respond within 3000 ms after onset of the cue, the mes-
sage “too slow” appeared on the screen signaling the end of the
trial. Participants were instructed that they had about 3000 ms to
provide their judgment. Participants were told that they did not
have to respond as fast as possible, but rather they had to seriously
evaluate whether the person on the photograph liked or disliked
the participant. Trials on which participants responded too slow
(i.e., after 3000 ms from cue onset) were excluded from the analy-
sis. When participants provided their judgment, a visualization of
their response (“YES” or “NO”) was immediately displayed to the
left of the peer’s face. After a fixed delay of 3000 ms (i.e., the antic-
ipation period), feedback appeared to the right of the peer’s face
for 2000 ms, communicating either social acceptance (“YES”) or
rejection (“NO”). Social rejection feedback (“NO”) was presented
on 50% of the trials1. Feedback in this paradigm was not actual
peer-feedback, but fictitious feedback that was pseudo-randomly
generated by the computer, such that at least on 50% of the tri-
als participants received acceptance feedback. Between trials, a
fixation cross was presented in the center of the screen with a jit-
tered duration between 500 and 1500 ms. Participants started with
10 practice trials, and then completed three experimental blocks
comprising 50 trials each. At the end of the experiment, electroen-
cephalography (EEG) equipment was detached and participants
were asked to write down their experiences and thoughts about the
experiment. Subsequently, participants filled out the abovemen-
tioned questionnaires. None of the participants had doubts about
the cover story. Participants were debriefed about the true purpose
of this study by letter after the last participant was examined.
BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS
The following behavioral data was used for analysis: the number
of acceptance and rejection judgments, as well as the reac-
tion time (RT) that was needed to provide these judgments.
A bias score was calculated to examine whether participants
anticipated significantly more acceptance than rejection feed-
back (Van der Veen et al., 2013). This bias score was derived from
1The presentation of the participants’ judgments (i.e., to the left of the face) and
the feedback (i.e., to the right of the face) may result in contralateral event-related
brain activity. As we were only interested in the events prior to (SPN) and during
feedback-processing (FRN/P3), participant’s attention to the right visual field may
be associated with ERP maxima over the left hemisphere. However, this potential
lateralization confound would not affect the hypothesized amplitude differences in
the SPN and feedback-related conditions, as lateralization of stimuli did not vary
by condition.
FIGURE 1 | An illustration of a single trial in the social evaluation
paradigm. On each trial, participants are presented with a
photograph of a peer. The participant is asked to judge whether the
peer would either like (accept) or dislike (reject) the participant. Based
on judgment type (“YES” or “NO”) and feedback type (“YES” or
“NO”), four possible feedback conditions were included: expected
social acceptance (“YES–YES”), expected social rejection (“NO–NO”),
unexpected social acceptance (“NO–YES”), or unexpected social
rejection (“YES–NO”). This particular trial shows an example of
unexpected social rejection.
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dividing the number of acceptance judgments by the number of
total judgments. This bias score either reflects an optimism bias
(>50%) or a pessimism bias (<50%).
EEG RECORDING AND SIGNAL PROCESSING
Electroencephalography time series were recorded at a 1024 Hz
sampling rate from 64 Ag–AgCl electrodes mounted in an elas-
tic electrode cap (10/20 placement) using a BioSemi Active Two
system (Biosemi, Amsterdam, The Netherlands). The BioSemi sys-
tem replaces the ground electrode by a feedback loop consisting
of the common mode sense (CMS) electrode and Driven right leg
(DRL) electrode; CMS was used as the online reference. Horizontal
electrooculography (HEOG) was measured from two electrodes
placed at the left and right canthus; vertical EOG (VEOG) was
measured from two electrodes placed above and below the left eye.
Two electrodes were placed at the mastoids. Offline processing
of the EEG was performed with Brain Vision Analyzer 2 (Brain
Products GmbH). The EEG signal was down-sampled to 512 Hz,
re-referenced to the average of the left and right mastoids and
offline band-pass filtered between 0.1 and 40 Hz (24 dB/oct),
with a 50 Hz notch filter. Ocular artifacts were removed auto-
matically using the Infomax Ocular ICA method as implemented
in Brain Vision Analyzer. Subsequently, segments were created to
isolate the SPN and feedback-related brain potentials (FRN and
P3). All segments were visually inspected for remaining artifacts.
The average number of segments used for analyses of the SPN and
feedback-related components is presented in Table 3.
To isolate the SPN, 3500 ms segments were created includ-
ing a 200 ms post feedback-stimulus interval. These segments
included the participants’ judgments (responses) occurring at
3000 ms prior to the onset of the feedback stimulus. The 2400–
2000 ms interval was used for baseline correction, as this time
period most likely is the start of the anticipation period and visual
inspection verified the absence of any residual motor activity. Pre-
vious studies have shown that setting baseline corrections prior
to motor responses may confound the SPN by including antici-
patory activity associated with the response preparation (Brunia
et al., 2011). In line with prior studies, the SPN was calculated
using a mean amplitude measurement within the 200 ms inter-
val prior to the onset of the feedback stimulus at the Fz electrode
(Kotani and Aihara, 1999; Ohgami et al., 2006; Stavropoulos and
Carver, 2013). Although the SPN usually reaches peak amplitude
at frontal electrode sites (Böcker et al., 2001; Brunia et al., 2011)
Table 3 | Means, standard deviations (SD), and range (minimum–
maximum) of the number of trials that were used to calculate the
SPN and the feedback-related brain potentials.
Component (condition) Mean (SD) Range (min.–max.)
SPN (predicted acceptance) 74.42 (13.32) 44–104
SPN (predicted rejection) 59.98 (12.63) 29–90
Feedback (expected acceptance) 36.98 (7.09) 20–55
Feedback (unexpected rejection) 37.22 (8.75) 19–57
Feedback (expected rejection) 29.98 (8.22) 13–49
Feedback (unexpected acceptance) 30.02 (6.64) 14–46
data from the parietal–occipital electrodes PO7 and PO8 were ana-
lyzed also, as visual inspection of the data revealed that the SPN
reached largest amplitudes over these leads in both anticipation
conditions2.
To isolate the feedback-related ERPs, 1200 ms epochs were cre-
ated including a 200 ms pre-stimulus interval, which was used
for baseline correction. FRN amplitude was measured using the
peak-to-peak method described by Holroyd et al. (2003), since a
single peak measurement often confounds FRN amplitude due to
overlap with the earlier P2 component (Luck, 2005). In line with
Holroyd et al. (2003), the onset of the FRN was determined by
finding the most positive peak within a 200–300 ms time window
(i.e., the P2 component). From the onset of the negativity, the
most negative peak was determined within the 250–350 ms time
window. FRN amplitudes were obtained by subtracting the P2
peak from this most negative value. Finally, the feedback-related
P3 component was examined by calculating the mean amplitude
in a time window between 360 and 440 ms, as recommended by
Luck (2005).
STATISTICAL ANALYSES
Statistical Analyses were performed in three successive steps: (1)
Task performance was analyzed using a one-sample t-test to
verify a significant difference in judgment type. Pearson product-
moment correlation was performed to examine the correlation
between judgment type and level of FNE; (2) Anticipatory brain
activity (SPN) was assessed using a repeated measures ANOVA
with Site (three levels: Fz, PO7, PO8) and Judgment (two levels:
acceptance, rejection) as within-subject factors to test where the
SPN reached peak amplitude, and whether this differed between
Judgment types. Post hoc analyses were performed to explore sig-
nificant main or interaction effects; (3) For the feedback-related
ERPs, a repeated measures analysis was performed, separately for
the FRN and P3, with the within-subject factors Congruency (two
levels: congruent, incongruent) and Valence (two levels: positive,
negative). Post hoc analyses were performed to explore significant
main or interaction effects. Pearson product-moment correlation
analyses were performed to test our behavioral and ERP hypothe-
ses. Bonferroni corrections for multiple comparisons were applied.
Statistical analyses were performed using IBM SPSS Statistics 19
(IBM Corporation, 2010). The behavioral and EEG data were
inspected for outliers (i.e., data points above or below two standard
deviations of the sample’s mean). No outliers were detected. Alpha
was set at 0.05 and additional post hoc significance testing was
performed using Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons.
Greenhouse–Geisser correction was applied when necessary, and
non-adjusted degrees of freedom were reported for transparency3.
2We also analyzed the SPN in an 800 ms time-window before the onset of the
feedback using a mean amplitude calculation. This analysis did not yield significant
differences from the 200 ms time-window analysis. As can be seen in Figure 2, the
difference in SPN amplitude are most pronounced during the last 200 ms, indicating
that the 200 ms time-window best reflects the anticipatory process (Poli et al., 2007).
3A post hoc power analysis was run to determine whether our participant sample was
large enough to obtain appropriate statistical power. Results of this analysis revealed
that a sample of N = 37 is required to obtain an appropriate level of statistical power
at 0.80. Therefore any conclusions about the significance of the results presented
below were made with a certain level of caution.
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RESULTS
TASK PERFORMANCE
An average response bias score of 56% (SD = 0.09) was observed
indicating that participants displayed an optimism bias in antic-
ipating more social acceptance feedback. A one-sample t-test
verified that this bias score differed significantly from the base-
line (i.e., 50%), as participants anticipated acceptance feedback
(Mean number of trials = 82.42, SD = 13.76) more often than
rejection feedback (Mean number of trials = 65.68, SD = 14.17),
t(30) = 3.36, p = 0.002. Next, we tested the hypothesis that females
with higher levels of FNE would anticipate rejection feedback
more often, however, no significant positive correlation yielded
between FNE scores and the percentage of negative judgments,
r(31) = 0.30, p = 0.106.
Subsequently, we analyzed the RT data of the anticipated accep-
tance and rejection judgments using a one-sample t-test. No
significant differences were observed in the RT of acceptance
(Mean RT = 1366.91, SD = 274.85) and rejection judgments
(Mean RT = 1391.34, SD = 266.66). However, as shown in
Figure 2, a Pearson product-moment correlation analysis revealed
that females with higher FNE-S scores displayed longer RTs for
predicting acceptance, r(31) = 0.44, p = 0.014, and rejection feed-
back, r(31) = 0.41, p = 0.021. This response time effect remained
significant after controlling for the effect of behavioral inhibi-
tion for predicting acceptance (p = 0.013) and rejection feedback
(p = 0.022), respectively.
ANTICIPATORY BRAIN ACTIVITY: STIMULUS PRECEDING NEGATIVITY
Results of average SPN amplitudes per judgment type are depicted
in Figure 3 for the Fz, PO7, and PO8 electrodes. Peak SPN
amplitudes within the 200 ms time-window before the onset of
the feedback stimulus were extracted from the Fz, PO7, and
PO8 electrodes (see Figure 3). As revealed by a main effect of
Site, SPN peak amplitude was larger at PO7 than at Fz and
PO8, F(1,30) = 9.16, p = 0.005, η2p = 0.23. The main effect of
Judgment revealed that the SPN was more negative for accep-
tance than for rejection judgments, F(1,30) = 6.21, p = 0.018,
η2p = 0.23. No significant interaction between site and judgment
was observed, F(2,60) = 0.05, p = 0.950, η2p = 0.00. Pear-
son product-moment correlation analyses revealed a significant
correlation between the RT for anticipated social rejection judg-
ments and the corresponding SPN, r(31) = −0.48, p = 0.001 (see
Figure 3).
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE SPN AND FNE
A subsequent step was to examine whether SPN amplitudes during
anticipated social acceptance or rejection could predict the level
of FNE, as indexed with the FNE. Pearson correlations were run
between the SPN amplitudes during positive and negative feedback
anticipation, respectively, with the FNE scores. SPN amplitudes
at the PO7 were used, since SPN amplitudes were largest at this
lead. As shown in Figure 4, SPN amplitudes associated with
acceptance judgments correlated significantly with FNE-S scores,
r(31) = −0.37, p = 0.021. No significant correlation was found
between the SPN associated with anticipated social rejection and
FNE-S scores.
FIGURE 2 | Correlations between the Fear of Negative Evaluation
(FNE) and the RT of social acceptance (A) and social rejection
(B) judgments. Individuals with higher levels of FNE needed significantly
more time to provide both social acceptance (“YES”) and social rejection
(“NO”) judgments.
FEEDBACK RELATED BRAIN ACTIVITY: FRN AND P3
Brain potentials elicited by the feedback stimuli are depicted in
Figure 5. Peak FRN amplitudes at electrode FCz were submitted
to a repeated measures analysis with Congruency (two levels: con-
gruent, incongruent) and Valence (two levels: positive, negative)
as within-subject factors. The main effect of congruency revealed
that FRN amplitudes for incongruent feedback were larger than
for congruent feedback, however, this difference just failed to reach
levels of significance, F(1,30) = 3.84, p = 0.059, η2p = 0.11. The
main effect of valence was also not significant, F(1,30) = 1.04,
p = 0.317, η2p = 0.03, suggesting that FRN amplitude did not differ
between positive and negative feedback. No significant interaction
between Congruency and Valence was observed, F(2,60) = 0.00,
p = 0.953, η2p = 0.00.
Peak P3 amplitudes at Pz were submitted to a repeated measures
analysis with Congruency (two levels: congruent, incongruent)
and Valence (two levels: positive, negative) as within-subject
factors. As expected, P3 amplitudes for unexpected feedback did
not differ from expected feedback, F(1,30) = 0.08, p = 0.783,
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FIGURE 3 |The stimulus preceding negativity (SPN) associated
with social-evaluative feedback anticipation. SPN amplitudes were
larger for expected social acceptance than for social rejection, and
reached peak amplitudes at PO7 (A). Current source density maps
show the left posterior dominance of the SPN (B). Correlations
between SPN amplitude and reaction time (RT) of the judgments for
expected social acceptance (C) and social rejection (D) feedback. An
increase in SPN amplitude during expected social rejection was
associated with a significant increase in RT of the corresponding
judgment. *p < 0.05.
η2p = 0.00. In contrast with our expectations, the main effect
of Valence was also not significant, F(1,30) = 1.50, p = 0.230,
η2p = 0.05, suggesting that P3 amplitude was not significantly
larger for positive than for negative social-evaluative feedback.
No significant interaction between Congruency and Valence
was observed for the P3, F(2,60) = 0.04, p = 0.849,
η2p = 0.03.
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE SPN AND FEEDBACK-RELATED BRAIN
POTENTIALS
Next, Pearson product-moment correlations were run between
the SPN and feedback-related brain potentials. We examined
these correlations between SPN and the feedback components
separately for anticipated acceptance and anticipated rejection.
This resulted in two sets of eight correlations for (1) the SPN
during anticipated acceptance versus the FRN and P3 in the four
conditions (i.e., expected acceptance/rejection, unexpected accep-
tance/rejection), and (2) the SPN during anticipated rejection
versus the FRN and P3 in the four conditions (i.e., expected accep-
tance/rejection, unexpected acceptance/rejection). Bonferroni
correction for multiple comparisons was used (i.e., p < 0.006).
Results revealed that an increase in SPN amplitude in the antici-
pated acceptance condition (“Yes” anticipations) was associated
with a significant increase in P3 amplitude after anticipated
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FIGURE 4 | Correlation between SPN amplitude and the fear of
negative evaluation (FNE). A significant correlation was observed
between the SPN and FNE when participants were anticipating social
acceptance (A). This effect was not observed when participants were
anticipating social rejection (B).
acceptance (“Yes” feedback), r(31) = −0.47, p = 0.004. Par-
tial correlation analysis revealed that this effect did not remain
significant after controlling for levels of FNE, r(31) = 0.42,
p = 0.021.
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN FEEDBACK-RELATED BRAIN ACTIVITY AND
FNE
Lastly, we examined whether feedback-related brain activity cor-
related with FNE. However, no significant results were observed
(all p’s > 0.006).
DISCUSSION
The impetus of this study was to investigate precursors of fear
of social evaluation by examining behavioral and electrophysio-
logical correlates of social-evaluative feedback anticipation and
processing. We used a social-judgment paradigm in which par-
ticipants were asked to indicate whether they believed to be
accepted or rejected by their peers. In line with our hypoth-
esis, results provided evidence of an optimism bias in social
peer evaluation; namely, participants more often predicted to
be socially accepted than rejected by peers. We did not find
evidence for our hypothesis that the number of social rejec-
tion judgments correlated positively with the level of FNE in
female participants. Interestingly, however, the current study
shows that an increase in FNE levels corresponded with a sig-
nificant increase in the response time of the participants to
provide their judgments about upcoming social evaluation. The
SPN – a brain potential associated with feedback anticipation –
was larger during anticipated acceptance than rejection feed-
back. Furthermore, SPN amplitudes correlated positively with the
level of FNE when participants were anticipating social accep-
tance feedback. Together, the current study provides evidence of
information processing biases during social-evaluative feedback
anticipation in adult females, which are modulated by the level
of FNE.
In line with our hypothesis, we observed a significantly larger
proportion of acceptance judgments compared to rejection judg-
ments. This corroborates previous findings of two studies by Gun-
ther Moor et al. (2010a,b), and may be indicative of an optimistic
self-evaluation bias. Hepper et al. (2011) recently demonstrated
that expectations about social-evaluative feedback are generally
positive, a finding that was interpreted to reflect the situational
motivation to self-enhance. According to self-enhancement the-
ory, people have the tendency to see themselves better than they
actually are (Taylor and Brown, 1988). Thus, people may antici-
pate more positive than negative self-evaluations. This optimistic
self-evaluation bias is also in accordance with social belongingness
theory (Baumeister and Leary, 1995), which states that people
have a fundamental need for positive social relationships. This
desire of social belongingness is an evolutionary-rooted human
motivation to form and maintain social bonds, since these social
bonds increase the chances for socio-emotional and physical well-
being (Macdonald and Leary, 2005). The strength of this “need
to belong” has furthermore been demonstrated by Maner et al.
(2007), who observed that even the experience of social exclusion
elicited the desire to form social bonds with other people and allo-
cate positive evaluations to others, in the hope to establish renewed
social connections.
In the current study, we examined whether this optimistic
self-evaluation bias was related to levels of FNE as well as
levels of generalized social anxiety (LSAS), but we found no
evidence for such a correlation. We did find that participants
with higher levels in FNE were significantly slower in judg-
ing whether social-evaluative feedback was positive or negative.
This increment in response time in those females higher in FNE
may be due to increased self-focused attention and vigilance
imposed by the task demands, which could subsequently com-
promise information processing efficiency. In the current study,
the social-evaluative threat may have prompted an increase in
self-focused attention – a stimulus-driven process that is posited
to interfere with disengaging attention from socially threaten-
ing stimuli – fueling maladaptive cognitions, and resulting in a
greater effort in preparing responses (Judah et al., 2013). Although
speculative, mainly due to the absence of an objective mea-
sure of self-focused attention in the current study, this notion
is in line with the attentional control theory (ACT), which
states that anxiety impairs processing efficiency in conditions
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FIGURE 5 | Feedback-related brain potentials elicited by social
acceptance and rejection feedback (A,B). FRN amplitudes were largest at
FCz (A), whereas the P3 reached peak amplitudes at Pz (B). C,D shows peak
amplitudes of the FRN and P3 for the four social-evaluative feedback
conditions. The FRN seems sensitive to congruency of feedback; however,
this effect was not significant. The P3 seems larger for social acceptance
feedback than for social rejection feedback, but also these differences were
not significant. E displays the current sources density maps of P3 activity.
that place a high demand on cognitive resources (Eysenck et al.,
2007).
At the electrocortical level, we observed that SPN ampli-
tudes were significantly larger when participants were anticipating
social acceptance compared to social rejection feedback. The left
parietal–occipital predominance of the SPN was most likely due to
the switch of attention to the contralateral visual field, since feed-
back stimuli were presented right from the photographs of peers.
The functional significance of the SPN is often debated, but there
is accumulating evidence suggesting that the SPN reflects affec-
tive motivational anticipatory processes (Poli et al., 2007; Brunia
et al., 2011). A host of electrophysiological studies revealed that
SPN amplitudes tend to be larger for stimuli that are reward-
ing (Ohgami et al., 2004; Mattox et al., 2006; Ohgami et al., 2006;
Stavropoulos and Carver, 2013). In the current study, receiv-
ing social acceptance feedback would be more rewarding than
rejection feedback, which could be related to the enhanced SPN
amplitudes when participants were anticipating social acceptance.
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This interpretation meshes with the aforementioned social belong-
ingness theory, namely that participants were anticipating social
acceptance more often than rejection, as social acceptance facili-
tates the formation of new social bonds and general wellbeing of
the individual.
An alternative account on the functionality of the SPN is the
“uncertainty hypothesis”, which posits that the SPN would be
larger when predictions are made for highly unpredictable or
uncertain outcomes (Catena et al., 2012). In the current study
we observed that SPN amplitudes were larger in participants who
were slower in providing their judgment about upcoming social
rejection feedback. This slowing in response time for predicting
social rejection feedback may be indicative of uncertainty about
social rejection, as the optimistic self-evaluation bias revealed that
participants more often predicted to be socially accepted. How-
ever, this interpretation is in stark contrast to the observation
that SPN amplitudes were larger when participants anticipated
to be socially accepted. Moreover, results showed that SPN ampli-
tudes correlated positively with the levels of FNE when participants
anticipated social acceptance. Based on the uncertainty hypothe-
sis it was a priori expected that females with higher levels of FNE
would anticipate social rejection more often, thereby rendering
social acceptance as less likely and therefore uncertain. Due to
the absence of a pessimistic self-evaluation bias in females with
higher levels of FNE, it seems unlikely that the augmented SPN
in high FNE females can be explained by uncertainty about the
social-evaluative outcome. The larger SPN amplitudes when antic-
ipating social acceptance feedback may be reflective of the intrinsic
motivation to be socially accepted, which dovetails with the afore-
mentioned social belongingness theory (Baumeister and Leary,
1995). Also, the distribution of FNE scores in the current sample
indicated that only a few participants (N = 3) met the criteria for
higher levels of social anxiety (Carleton et al., 2011), whereas the
majority of the participants could be placed on the middle range of
the social anxiety continuum (Rapee and Spence, 2004). According
to Rapee and Spence (2004), these individuals can often be charac-
terized by having a strong desire to be positively evaluated. Future
studies should examine whether the behavioral and electrocorti-
cal findings will be exaggerated in participants with clinical levels
of social anxiety, or whether these participants will (1) anticipate
rejection feedback more often, and (2) will display a differen-
tial pattern of brain activation during social-evaluative feedback
anticipation.
The processing of social-evaluative feedback was indexed by
the FRN and P3. Results revealed that feedback that violated
prior anticipations (e.g., unexpected acceptance and unexpected
rejection) was associated with larger FRN amplitudes, rela-
tive to feedback that was congruent with prior anticipations;
however, this incongruency effect just failed to reach levels of
significance. The FRN is typically seen after incongruent feed-
back communicating unexpected feedback or poor performance
(Van Noordt and Segalowitz, 2012). Although social-evaluative
feedback in the current study could be incongruent with prior
expectations, the absence of a significant incongruency effect
may be explained by the fact that incongruent feedback did
not communicate task performance. That is, FRN amplitudes
may be larger for incongruent feedback that can be used to
optimize future task performance. Based on prior neuroimag-
ing findings of Somerville et al. (2006), we anticipated a pro-
nounced FRN in this study, since a candidate source of the
FRN (i.e., the ACC) seems differentially activated by social-
evaluative feedback and expectancy violations. These authors
found that the dorsal ACC was particularly activated by incon-
gruent feedback, whereas the vACC was activated by acceptance
feedback. The surface EEG potentials in the current study evi-
dently lacked the fine-grained spatial resolution to pick up these
differences.
Based on recent findings of Van der Veen et al. (2013) we
anticipated finding a larger P3 component when social-evaluative
feedback communicated acceptance. Indeed, anticipated social
acceptance feedback elicited largest P3 amplitudes, and an overall
trend was observed in the current study suggesting that the P3
was larger for acceptance than rejection feedback. However, these
differences were not significant. This could be due to differences
in sample size between our study (N = 31) and the Van der Veen
et al. (2013) study (N = 17), and/or differences in the number
of experimental trials. The current study does add an important
dimension to the interpretation of the enhanced P3 after antici-
pated social acceptance feedback reported by Van der Veen et al.
(2013). Namely, we found that an increase in SPN amplitude
during anticipated social acceptance correlated significantly with
P3 amplitudes in this condition. This finding is in accord with
neuroimaging results reported by Gunther Moor et al. (2010b),
showing enhanced vACC activity to social acceptance feedback in
those individuals who also expected to be liked. These authors
postulated that social acceptance is more salient when individuals
also anticipate to be accepted. The current correlation between
the SPN (anticipation) and P3 (feedback processing) may provide
further support for this notion.
There are a few limitations to the current study. First, the limited
sample size (N = 31) and the use of an undergraduate sample of
female participants (instead of using a group comparison between
healthy controls and a clinical sample) impede the generalization
of the current findings to patients with social anxiety disorder. Sec-
ond, no causal interferences can be made from the correlational
analyses with respect to FNE or social anxiety. Moreover, given
the absence of a correlation between self-reported social anxiety
(LSAS) with the behavioral and electrocortical data, the current
findings may only be related to a certain aspect of the social anxiety
spectrum, namely social-evaluative threat. Therefore our findings
are preliminary and in future studies it will be important to exam-
ine whether this pattern of findings exists in a group of clinically
diagnosed socially anxious patients. A third limitation of the cur-
rent experimental design is that the psychological experience of
predicting to be liked or disliked perfectly covaries with the physi-
cal attributes of the feedback stimulus (i.e., the word“yes”or“no”).
Since no counterbalancing was possible using these feedback stim-
uli, differences in SPN amplitude between conditions may partly
be due to the imagination of these feedback stimuli while antic-
ipating this type of feedback. We argue that this effect would be
negligible; however, futures studies may consider using different
feedback stimuli (e.g., symbols) that are presented in a counterbal-
anced fashion. Fourth, our participants were not asked about their
subjective estimates of the relative proportion of receiving positive
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or negative feedback, before and after the study. This information
could yield individual differences in subjective estimation of the
proportion of acceptance or rejection feedback that participants
received. For example, participants higher in FNE may overesti-
mate the proportion of social rejection feedback. Although we did
not find such differences based on the actual judgments during the
task, Somerville et al. (2010) demonstrated that participants with
high self-esteem overestimated the proportion of social acceptance
feedback. Future studies should ask this information from partici-
pants in exit interviews, as this may shed light on perceptual biases
in interpreting social-evaluative outcomes.
In conclusion, by investigating both behavioral and electro-
cortical correlates of social-evaluative processes, the current study
demonstrates that individuals high in FNE display information
processing biases during the anticipatory stages of social evalu-
ation. In contrast to the prevailing notion that socially anxious
individuals anticipate to be socially rejected, we did not find evi-
dence that confirmed this bias in females with higher FNE levels.
Results did show, however, that females higher in FNE needed
more time to make their judgments about an upcoming social-
evaluative outcome. This significant increase in RT may reflect
heightened self-focused attention and vigilance imposed by the
upcoming social-evaluative threat. An interesting objective for
subsequent investigations is to examine whether the SPN during
social feedback anticipation is driven by uncertainty and/or the
intrinsic motivation to be socially accepted, and how these pro-
cesses are (differentially) modulated by FNE. Taken together, this
study accentuated the importance of a temporally fine-grained
electrophysiological method to assess social-evaluative informa-
tion processing. Results provided novel insights into the behavioral
and electrocortical correlates of social-evaluative feedback antici-
pation that may set the stage for future studies on delineating trait
markers of social anxiety.
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